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Abstract
This paper explores the European Union’s (EU) security relationship with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States (US) through the framework of 
the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Skeptics have decried the rise of CSDP 
as a new security pillar, arguing that it is an attempt to balance against NATO and the US. 
I argue that this criticism is false. A comparison of two CSDP military operations, Euro-
pean Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and European Union Force Althea 
(EUFOR Althea), shows that operational success is heavily dependent on the EU’s ability 
to use NATO assets through the Berlin Plus agreement. While EU security integration has 
progressed, it continues to suffer from a significant capabilities gap; without access to NATO 
capabilities, CSDP military operations face many challenges. I conclude that CSDP is not 
threatening the transatlantic relationship because the EU remains a limited hard power actor 
in promoting and securing international security.
Keywords
CSDP, NATO, Berlin Plus, transatlantic security relationship, capabilities gap
1
CSDP and NATO: Rethinking the 
Transatlantic Security Relationship
Pia Bhathal
University of Southern California
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 1
CSDP and NATO: Rethinking the Transatlantic Security Relationship
Pia Bhathal University of Southern California2
Introduction
The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) represents an important step for-
ward in security integration in the European Union (EU). Agreed upon through the 1998 St. 
Malo Declaration, CSDP operationalizes the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
through an intergovernmental structure. Emphasizing both military and civilian capabili-
ties, CSDP missions have been underway since 2003 and seek to promote regional stability. 
However, some skeptics have decried the rise of CSDP as a new security pillar, arguing 
that it undermines the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
threatens the US-EU transatlantic security relationship through its balancing effect (Ryn-
ning, 2011). I argue that this criticism of CSDP is weak and rather a misconception. The 
EU has invoked the Berlin Plus agreement to conduct two CSDP military operations thus 
far. A comparison of one of these operations with a non-Berlin Plus military operation of 
comparable scope reveals that operational success is heavily dependent on the EU’s ability 
to use NATO assets through the Berlin Plus agreement: without access to NATO’s capabili-
ties, CSDP military operations face many challenges and often end prematurely or in failure. 
While EU security integration has progressed, it continues to suffer from a significant capa-
bilities gap, making any serious fear of the development of CSDP as a competitive European 
security pillar misplaced. 
This paper will explore the EU’s security relationship with NATO and the US through 
the framework of CSDP. Through a comparison of two case studies, I will show that the EU 
is more successful in its CSDP military operations when utilizing NATO assets. Part one 
will provide necessary background information regarding (1) the larger transatlantic security 
debate, (2) the EU’s capabilities gap and efforts to address this issue through the establishment 
of the European Defense Agency (EDA), and (3) the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement. 
Part two will focus on two CSDP military operations – European Union Force Chad/CAR 
(EUFOR Tchad/RCA), launched in 2008, and European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Al-
thea), launched in 2004. First, a rationale for why these cases were selected will be provided. 
Next, specifics about each operation and the overall assessment will be discussed. Part three 
will analyze why EUFOR Althea was a more successful operation. It will argue that the 
EU is reliant upon the Berlin Plus agreement for assets and capabilities for the success of its 
large-scale CSDP military operations. Therefore, the fear of CSDP balancing against NATO 
and US interests is unfounded. Finally, I will conclude that despite the operationalization of 
CFSP through CSDP, the EU remains a limited hard power actor in promoting and securing 
international security. 
Background Information
The transatlantic security relationship has significantly evolved since the creation of 
CSDP. As its member states collectively constitute a major player in NATO, the US has 
developed strong security links with the EU. However, since the end of the Cold War, US 
interest in Europe has declined and the US has called upon the EU to share the burden of 
maintaining peace and security in the international system. Interests between the transatlan-
tic actors have also diverged, causing a desire within the EU for some degree of autonomy 
that allows them to act separately from the US. This inclination for self-sufficiency led to the 
creation of CSDP in 1998, which was seen as a “threat to undermine NATO’s status as the 
preeminent security organization” (Joachim, 2010, p. 42). Although the US wanted to engage 
in burden sharing with the EU, the attitude towards CSDP was unfavorable because US 
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government officials worried that the rise of a European security pillar would balance against 
NATO for power and influence. In order to emphasize that the US would not support 
CSDP if it undermined NATO’s influence, Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State 
during the Clinton administration, developed the “3 D’s” (Keohane 2009, p. 128). These 
outlined the three preconditions for US support: “no de-coupling of the US from Europe, 
no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, and no duplication of NATO assets” 
(Keohane, 2009, p. 128). De-coupling and duplication became large concerns during the 
Bush administration as the US viewed the EU’s new role as an international security actor 
with reluctance. Meanwhile, the EU defended its decision to act independently of NATO 
by arguing that CSDP is helping them develop into a more viable security partner for the 
benefit of the transatlantic relationship. This viewpoint has gained more acceptance under 
the current Obama administration as CSDP is no longer considered as strong of a threat to 
US military power and influence.  
The main reason CSDP is no longer seen as threatening to US influence is that the EU 
suffers from a significant capabilities gap. Combined EU defense spending is nearly €200 bil-
lion per year; however, the EU does not spend efficiently (European Defense Agency, 2010, 
p. 2). This has resulted in a gap between what the EU possesses and what it can actually uti-
lize. Furthermore, while the EU has approximately 1.7 million active duty troops among all 
EU member states, it struggles to deploy even 4% of them because member states’ militaries 
are still geared towards traditional Cold War scenarios (Cross, 2011). This has contributed to 
a severe lack of available troops for CSDP, undermining the overall effectiveness of several 
military operations. There have been many political initiatives to address the shortage of 
military personnel and equipment. In 1999, EU member states agreed to the Helsinki Head-
line Goal, which called for the ability to “deploy rapidly and sustain forces capable of the full 
range of the Petersberg Tasks” (De Waele, 2011, p. 56). The target was to have forces ranging 
up to 60,000 personnel capable of deploying within 60 days for a period of at least one year 
(De Waele, 2011). However, progress was slow and the goal was replaced in 2007 by EU 
Battle Groups. The implementation of these groups signifies a declining military ambition as 
they consist of only “1,500 men, being ready for command within 10 days” and sustainable 
for a maximum of 120 days (De Waele, 2011, p. 57). The European Council has yet to agree 
to call upon a Battle Group, forcing CSDP operations to rely upon a weak Force Catalogue 
system (Cross, 2011). In order to address the capabilities gap and thereby increase the EU’s 
ability to provide personnel and equipment for CSDP military operations, the EDA was 
established in 2004 to aid in “identifying operational requirements, stimulating the necessary 
research and expenditure, and strengthening the industrial and technological base of the Eu-
ropean defense sector” (De Waele, 2011, p. 54). As a facilitator of collaboration, the EDA was 
created with the hope of increasing the EU’s military presence in the international system 
by eliminating duplications, promoting defense spending, and integrating research among 
member-states (Keohane, 2004). But its success has been limited thus far, resulting in a CSDP 
suffering with sub-par military capabilities. 
In order to overcome the EU’s lack of military capabilities and promote inter-organi-
zational cooperation, the EU and NATO agreed in 2003 to a special arrangement known as 
Berlin Plus. This agreement provides the EU with “assured access to NATO assets and capa-
bilities” (Bergeron, 2004, p. 41) for CSDP operations in locations “where NATO as a whole 
is not engaged” (Bergeron, 2004, p. 41).  After NATO has declined to intervene in a given 
crisis and unanimous approval among members is given, the EU may utilize Berlin Plus to 
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augment their “force generation and operational planning capabilities” (Bergeron, 2004, p. 
42) for CSDP operations, thereby overcoming its own military capabilities gap. As will be 
shown through two contrasting case studies, the Berlin Plus agreement has proven to affect 
whether CSDP military operations are ultimately successful. When utilizing NATO assets 
and capabilities, operations have been much larger and more effective overall. In comparison, 
when the EU alone has been responsible for funding and providing the necessary resources, 
operations have been slow to deploy and have been plagued by planning and execution 
problems. Although obtaining the unanimous decision to provide NATO assets to the EU 
can present some challenges – namely delaying deployment – the Berlin Plus arrangement 
remains the best option for the EU to utilize when conducting CSDP military operations. It 
not only strengthens EU-NATO cooperation, but also helps the EU overcome its capabili-
ties gap. 
CSDP Military Operations – EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR Althea
I will utilize case studies of EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR Althea to support the 
argument that due to CSDP’s reliance on NATO assets and capabilities for military opera-
tions, the fear of the rise of CSDP as a competitive European security pillar is a misconcep-
tion. These case studies were selected because they are the largest CSDP military operations 
conducted with and without Berlin Plus. First, EUFOR Tchad/RCA will be discussed as it 
did not involve the Berlin Plus agreement. The operation suffered from a lack of resources, 
leading to a handoff to the United Nations (UN). These elements make it a useful compari-
son to EUFOR Althea, which is the most recent military operation to use the Berlin Plus 
arrangement. EUFOR Althea greatly benefited from the use of NATO assets and capabili-
ties, leading to one of CSDP’s largest military accomplishments.
EUFOR Tchad/RCA
EUFOR Tchad/RCA was launched in March 2008 for a duration of one year as the 
largest military operation not invoking the Berlin Plus agreement. The decision to launch an 
operation stemmed from concern regarding the instability on the Chad-Sudan-Central Af-
rican Republic (CAR) borders (Helly, 2009). Groups living along the borders were involved 
in many types of violence, especially since the “first massive flows of refugees from Darfur 
started to cross the border with Chad in 2003-2004” (Helly, 2004, p. 340). With Chad suffer-
ing from an internal political crisis, there was little to no control of “attacks from Sudanese 
and Chadian armed groups and Janjaweed militias against specific ethnic communities [or] 
the use of certain camps for recruitment of combatants and child soldiers” (Helly, 2004, p. 
340). These factors contributed to a highly insecure region undergoing a humanitarian crisis, 
prompting France to propose EU engagement in the region in 2007. 
Following adoption of the Crisis Management Concept in September 2007, “the 
French diplomatic machinery was mobilized to convince European partners as well as re-
luctant Chadian authorities” (Helly, 2004, p. 341) to accept and contribute to the CSDP 
military operation. UN Security Council Resolution 1778, adopted in October 2007, ap-
proved the deployment of a CSDP military operation in Chad and the CAR (Helly, 2004). 
It established the operational headquarters in Mont Valerien in France, which contributed 
to a communication gap between personnel at headquarters level and those at ground level. 
The aims of EUFOR Tchad/RCA were threefold: “[firstly] to contribute to protecting 
civilians in danger, [secondly] to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and…humanitar-
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ian personnel by helping to improve security, and [lastly] to contribute to protecting UN 
personnel, facilities, and equipment” (Helly, 2004, p. 339). This mandate complemented the 
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) as both 
hoped to tackle the regional effects of the Darfur conflict by focusing on the protection of 
civilians and promoting the rule of law. 
A total of 3,700 troops were deployed from 23 EU member states and 3 non-EU 
members including Russia, Croatia, and Albania for EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Helly, 2004). 
However, from the beginning, there was a lack of interest among EU member-states to in-
tervene as the force generation process “started painstakingly, with very few member states 
willing to contribute significant troops and resources” (Helley, 2004, p. 340). This was in part 
due to the fact that the situation on the ground in Chad presented many challenges with 
the larger threat of a regional crisis and different rebel groups. But it also reflects the EU’s 
inability to collectively provide adequate military personnel and equipment for large CSDP 
operations. France took on the role of the main financial and troop contributor, “shoulder-
ing probably 80% of the total costs” (Helly, 2004, p. 350). Furthermore, there were serious 
logistical limitations that delayed full operational capability being reached until September 
2008. Ensuring tactical air assets proved problematic as “it took months to obtain a limited 
number of urgently needed additional helicopters, which were eventually provided by a state 
outside the EU, Russia” (Vines, 2010, p. 1096). As a complex and large military undertaking, 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA required a considerable number of troops and equipment. The EU 
failed in providing these in a timely manner, highlighting its capabilities gap and continued 
inferiority to NATO as a hard power international security actor. 
Overall, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was too large of a military engagement for the EU to 
effectively carry out. Although Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) like Oxfam and 
International Crisis Group stated that the operation had contributed “to a safer environment 
and a certain sense of security among both the population and the humanitarian commu-
nity,” (Helly, 2004, p. 345) the fact remains that CSDP failed in reaching full operational 
capability until halfway through the mandate. This likely impacted the decision to not renew 
the operation past its initial mandate of one year. Instead, it was replaced by UN forces un-
der the MINURCAT mandate in March 2009 as originally planned. The lack of political 
will and material commitment by EU member states in this operation supports the argu-
ment that CSDP continues to suffer from capabilities shortfalls when acting without access 
to NATO assets. This undermines its power and influence as an international provider of 
security and stability through military means, quelling US fear of the rise of a competitive 
European security pillar. 
EUFOR Althea
EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched in December 2004 as the 
second, and, to date, most recent CSDP military operation to utilize Berlin Plus. It is an 
ongoing operation, reflecting the EU’s continued interest in ensuring security in the Balkan 
region. Shortly after Bosnia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1992, the state ex-
perienced a violent ethnic war that “pitted Bosnian Muslims, Croat Bosnians, and Bosnian 
Serbs against one another” (Keohane, 2009, p. 212). The EU proved inept in effectively deal-
ing with the war and bringing about peace and stability in the state. The war was brought to 
an end only when NATO militarily intervened and the US brokered the Dayton-Paris peace 
agreement (Keohane, 2009). After the war ended in 1995, NATO continued their presence 
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in the state, deploying 30,000 troops in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in 1996 (Keohane, 
2009). NATO’s SFOR operation ended in June 2004, when the organization announced 
that SFOR would be replaced by a CSDP military operation, which became EUFOR Al-
thea (Keohane, 2009). 
Full handover of the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO to the EU 
required approximately six months due to the technicalities of the Berlin Plus agreement. 
However, once “the precise meaning of EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, especial-
ly for planning” (Keohane, 2009, p. 213) were agreed upon, the “operational planning phase 
was relatively smooth” (Keohane, 2009, p. 213). EUFOR Althea was officially launched in 
December 2004 after NATO withdrew its involvement in the state and the UN adopted 
Security Council Resolution 1575, permitting EU engagement through CSDP (Keohane, 
2009). As this operation involved the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU had access to NATO 
assets and capabilities for operational planning and execution as well as force generation. Im-
portantly, EUFOR Althea’s headquarters was “co-located with NATO in the former SFOR 
headquarters” (Keohane, 2009, p. 215). This not only promoted EU-NATO cooperation, 
but also helped the EU determine their operational planning strategy with an understanding 
of the situation on the ground. The EU would have been incapable of doing this without 
the Berlin Plus agreement, leading to a more unrealistic and ineffective mandate like that of 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA. The CSDP operation’s official order was “to ensure compliance with 
the 1995 Dayton-Paris peace agreement, support the international community’s High Rep-
resentative, and assist the local authorities with a number of tasks” (Keohane, 2009, p. 211). 
These objectives were designed to deter any potential recurrence of civil war, and if such an 
occasion arose, CSDP forces were equipped with the necessary resources for military force.
 Unlike in the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, this CSDP military operation did not suf-
fer from a capabilities gap, largely due to the fact that it benefited from NATO assets through 
the Berlin Plus agreement. Without NATO personnel, equipment, and headquarters, the 
operation would have faced more challenges considering its scale and longevity. However, 
with the help of NATO members, such as Turkey, the EU deployed 7,000 troops to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 2004, making this the largest EU military operation in CSDP’s history 
(Keohane, 2009). Taking into account the EU’s capabilities gap and the fact that only 4% 
of its troops, or 68,000 soldiers, are deployed on average, the EU would have found it dif-
ficult to commit such a large number of troops to one single operation (European Defense 
Agency, 2010, p.19). Therefore, EUFOR Althea’s success was dependent upon NATO. The 
EU remains a limited promoter of international security through hard power, solidifying US 
supremacy in this sphere of influence. As the goals of the operation continue to be met, the 
number of troops deployed has decreased. Currently, 22 EU member states and five non-EU 
members are contributing a total number of 900 troops to EUFOR Althea (Keohane, 2009). 
Thus far, EUFOR Althea has been a very successful CSDP military operation. It “has 
demonstrated a successful and promising implementation of the Berlin Plus arrangement in 
the field” (Koops, 2010, p. 53) as NATO assets and capabilities have proved integral to meet-
ing the oepration’s mandate. Through this operation, the EU has been able to restore its once 
tarnished credibility among Bosnian citizens as a promoter of regional peace and security. 
EUFOR Althea has positively contributed to “collecting weapons, patrolling and intelli-
gence gathering” (Keohane, 2009, p. 216) as well as “capturing war criminals and tackling 
organized crime” (Keohane, 2009, p. 217). Progress in each of these areas is aiding Bosnia’s 
overall security and stability, which are essential preconditions for future acceptance into the 
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EU as a member state. Lastly, through this operation “a dense network of frequent and ef-
fective interactions between EU and NATO military staffs and strategic planners has been 
progressively forged” (Koops, 2010, p. 53). These interactions will likely prove useful in future 
operations involving the Berlin Plus agreement, and stabilize any threat perception by the 
US regarding the rise of a competitive European security organization in CSDP. 
The Impact of Berlin Plus and Lessons Learned
As shown through the two case studies, NATO continues to play a significant role in 
the ultimate success of large-scale CSDP military operations. Although the EU is well inte-
grated and more easily able to agree on the tactics of operations than NATO, the capabilities 
available significantly impact operational success. By providing the EU access to NATO as-
sets and capabilities, the Berlin Plus agreement greatly supported the planning and execution 
of EUFOR Althea. On the other hand, EUFOR Tchad/RCA was an engagement by the 
EU alone. Therefore, it suffered from the effects of a large EU capabilities gap, making the 
operation less successful than expected. As one of the largest CSDP military operations to 
date, EUFOR Tchad/RCA could have benefited from the Berlin Plus agreement in several 
ways. First, the ability to use a NATO headquarters in Chad could have facilitated better 
planning and execution strategies. Coordinating the operation from Mont Valerien in France 
was difficult as there was a gap in communication between personnel at headquarters level 
and personnel at ground level. This contributed to a lack of understanding, which could 
have been avoided if the operation had access to the established NATO headquarters in the 
region. Second, EUFOR Tchad/RCA failed to meet full operational capacity until halfway 
through the operation due to the EU’s inability to generate enough forces and equipment. 
Access to NATO capabilities and assets through Berlin Plus would have greatly helped in 
overcoming this challenge, resulting in quicker operability and a stronger, more influential 
CSDP operation overall. 
Taking into account the weaknesses of CSDP and the impact NATO can have on its 
operations, it is clear that the EU has limited capacity in comparison to NATO when engag-
ing in large military operations. The Berlin Plus agreement greatly aids in both planning and 
execution phases as “the EU is still not in a position to run a long-term and complex military 
operation, such as Althea, on its own without recourse to NATO’s capabilities” (Koops, 2010, 
p. 55). Therefore, if the EU hopes to retain its standing as a promoter of international security 
through the use of force, it should attempt to utilize the Berlin Plus arrangement whenever 
launching a complex and intense military operation. There are some caveats to this strategy, 
most important of which is that the “arrangement is shrouded in uncertainty about when 
NATO will act and when it will not” (Maves, 2011, p. 7) due to NATO’s right of first refusal 
to engage in a particular region. This right places NATO – and, by extension, the US – in a 
more powerful position than the EU. NATO has a degree of control over the EU’s emerging 
capability for force projection because the success of CSDP military operations relies heavily 
on access to NATO capabilities and assets. NATO decides when to share these through its 
right of first refusal, relegating the EU to a dependent position and essentially making any 
sort of power balance against US interests impossible. This will likely remain the status quo 
until the EU strengthens CSDP by overcoming its capabilities gap. The proposal to create a 
permanent operational headquarters in Brussels and EDA efforts to create more efficiency in 
defense spending (Keohane, 2004) will need to be taken seriously to bolster the development 
of the EU’s own capabilities. 
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Conclusion 
The assertion that the emergence of CSDP represents the rise of a new security pil-
lar capable of balancing against NATO and US interests is false. Considering the EU’s large 
capabilities gap and resulting reliance on NATO assets for military operations, CSDP does 
not threaten NATO’s position as the preeminent security organization in the international 
system. The EU remains limited in its ability to utilize force to promote international stabil-
ity and security, especially when it is unable to utilize the Berlin Plus agreement. The EDA’s 
efforts to strengthen military capabilities will likely require some time to take significant 
effect. However, this does not mean that CSDP cannot improve in the meantime. Instead of 
concentrating on large-scale military operations, the EU should temporarily reconfigure its 
focus to civilian and civilian-military combined missions as it has proved more successful and 
influential in this area. Doing so will enhance its ultimate development into a smart power, 
capable of utilizing a combination of soft and hard power in the international system. 
Author's Notes
I would like to thank Dr. Mai'a K. Davis Cross for her invaluable teaching and advice regard-
ing the development of this paper.
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